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Abstract
New Zealand's strategy to deploy ultra-fast next generation access networks (NGA) on the
basis of fibre to the home (FTTH) to the majority of the population by 2019 involves specific
public private partnerships for dedicated roll-out areas that are supported with substantial
financial aid by the Crown. This article explores in which way this strategy can be effective
and whether it is able to accelerate consumer demand for NGA. Several empirical studies
relating to the deployment and uptake of broadband technology consistently reveal factors
which are decisive for the diffusion of broadband technologies in developed countries. From
the supply-side perspective, the regulatory environment, associated incentives to deploy new
infrastructure, and government stimuli can be seen as important determinants. However, the
diffusion of a new technology in a given market requires consumer acceptance. The
consumer uptake of ultra-fast broadband (UFB) access will depend on the increase in speed
in relation to the existing access technology, and the existence of applications requiring this
increase. Taking these factors into account, some potential problems with New Zealand's roll-
out plan can be identified. It seems conceivable that the driving factor for fast broadband
uptake in New Zealand is, under the current set of applications, the migration from low
bandwidth broadband to higher bandwidths required for video streaming, but not necessarily
to ultra-fast broadband. In that sense, a diminishing marginal return of speed may be
assumed. Further, the regulatory environment might cause adverse effects for competing
broadband networks that are not subsidized, such as the recently rolled out VDSL network
and 4G mobile networks. Moreover, the incentives of retail service providers to offer fibre
based internet products are not clear cut. Because of vertical separation they are not
invested in network deployment. An empirical analysis of recent UFB uptake data could show
whether these assumptions are valid. 
 * Kay E. Winkler is a Research Assistant at the New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and 
Regulation (ISCR).
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1 Introduction
Fibre-optical next generation access (NGA) networks lately have attracted a great
deal of attention of policy makers around the world. It is generally believed that bringing fibre
networks closer to premises will provide impetus for the economy, and be essential for
modern societies in the coming decades. Hence, the wide-spread deployment of NGA has
become a policy priority in many countries, and New Zealand is one of them. In 2009, its
government started an investment programme that involves subsidies and public private
partnerships to foster development of NGA and has the objective to make fibre to the home
(FTTH) networks available to 70% of New Zealanders by 2019. Being roughly half-way
through that programme, it is time to reflect on the effects of the broadband policies on fibre
access network deployment, and also to reconsider the expectations about the demand of
the new technology by consumers.
Several factors are relevant for the success of telecommunications networks, and
more specifically of NGA. From the supply-side perspective, the regulatory environment,
associated incentives to deploy new infrastructure, and government stimuli can be seen as
important determinants. However, the diffusion of a new technology in a given market
depends on consumer acceptance, or uptake by consumers, measured in penetration levels.
Simply because consumers have the option to buy NGA, does not mean that they are
inclined to do so. New Zealand's NGA initiative addresses consumer demand only to a
limited extent, and has as its main goal the mere deployment of NGA, not its acceptance by
consumers. However, from an economic perspective, it must ultimately be evaluated on the
increase of welfare it generates, and that will depend on the degree to which it accelerates
NGA diffusion.
This paper sketches out the framework that governs the diffusion of NGA networks.
By reviewing a large body of existing empirical research, it can identify several factors that
seem generally applicable to the diffusion of broadband networks. Recent literature offers
valuable insight into the question of which factors determine broadband uptake and can be
expected to be influential for the diffusion of New Zealand's NGA as well. The first and main
part of this paper summarizes the empirical literature on the subject of broadband diffusion
and highlights the essential elements for an economic framework of NGA uptake. The
second part discusses briefly in which way that framework is applicable to the situation in
New Zealand. Some factors will be identified that seem to be relevant, but further research is
needed to make more accurate predictions of the potential effects of New Zealand's ultra-fast
broadband policy.
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2 Literature Review on the Diffusion of Broadband Infrastructures
There is plenty of literature dealing with determinants that influence the penetration of
new telecommunications services in society. The following sections concentrate on empirical
work, demonstrating that several elements of technology diffusion are in fact identifiable in
telecommunications markets world-wide. The first set of literature defines the patterns of
diffusion that can be observed for technological innovation in general and also in the
telecommunications sector. The second body of research assesses several determinants for
the speed of diffusion on the example of broadband technology. More recent literature is able
to retrospectively analyse empirical evidence, which is important to predict influencing factors
for fibre diffusion. The last section will summarize the findings of recently published articles in
the past three to four years. This research evaluates specifically the impact of access
regulation on both investments in fibre access networks and adoption of related high-speed
broadband services.
2.1 Theoretical Framework on Diffusion of Innovation in Telecommunications
In general terms, diffusion models are used to forecast the adoption of new
technologies by consumers, or in other words the penetration of innovations in society. Those
models are useful for the management of firms when deciding on investment strategies in a
given region, as well as for governments and regulators in finding optimal policies for shaping
markets in innovative industries.
Diffusion processes which were captured in mathematical models to allow the
forecasting of demand are likely to have sigmoid shapes (Bass, 1969; Rogers, 2003). These
algorithms depict the product life-cycle in a symmetric curve in which half of the market
saturation is completed in half of the time. It has been shown, however, that these functions
overestimate the adoption rate prior to the 50% saturation point (Meade and Islam, 2001). To
account for asymmetric diffusion curves, the initial models have been adapted in various
ways, leading to highly complex models. The difficulty with more complex models is that their
forecast accuracy is lower than less complex models (Meade and Islam, 2001). This is
problematic where data are limited, which is usually the case with innovative products when
adoption just begins. As an alternative, the Gompertz model can be used as a forecasting
tool that is less complex and more easily applied when a limited amount of data is available
(Gregg, Hassel and Richardson, 1964). 
In telecommunications markets, diffusion models are first and foremost used as
marketing tools to predict the demand for new products and their life-cycle (Meade and
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Islam, 2006; Fildes and Kumar, 2002). However, these models can also provide useful
information for policy makers regarding the choice of appropriate regulatory decisions
(Karaçuka and Çatik, 2012). 
It is generally accepted that S-shaped, or sigmoid, models are appropriate as a first
step towards analysing the diffusion of telecommunications services (Gruber and Verboven,
2001; Rouvinen, 2006; Sundqvist et al., 2005; Wu and Chu, 2010). The sigmoid curve
indicates different stages of the product life-cycle in telecommunications. During the initial
phase the product is introduced and is only adopted slowly by customers. With increasing
adoption, the information about the new product spreads and the uptake of customers
accelerates accordingly. When the diffusion gets closer to saturation, the curve reaches an
inflection point that marks the maturity stage in which the uptake slows down again (Golder
and Tellis, 2004). The initially slow and then increasingly accelerated adoption of
telecommunications products resembles the spread of epidemics which can usually be
depicted with sigmoid curves as well (Meade and Islam, 2006).  
There are several growth models having sigmoid diffusion curves that may be
applicable to telecommunications products. Meade and Islam (2001) examine 17 growth
models based on time series, and establish that those models that use fewer variables are
superior to forecast diffusion in the telecommunications sector. In accordance with their
findings, most authors find Logistic, Gompertz or Bass models suitable for analysing diffusion
of telecommunications products (Dekimpe et al., 1998; Gruber and Verboven, 2001; Lee and
Cho, 2007; Rouvinen, 2006; Sundqvist et al., 2005). Wu and Chu (2010) conclude that
different models may fit to different stages of life-cycles: before diffusion take-off the
Gompertz model is superior, whilst the Logistic model outperforms other models after the
inflection point and over the complete life-cycle of telecommunications products.  
For telecommunications services in Turkey, Karaçuka and Çatik (2012) assess the
ability of product growth models to forecast diffusion. They observe that the variable
exponential growth model is better suited for the diffusion of fixed line services. This
suggests that S-shaped models cannot predict the period of the maturity stage. On the other
hand, they find that the Gompertz model can better explain diffusion relating to mobile
telecommunication services. They conclude that the explanatory powers of different growth
models depend on the characteristics of the products and their life-cycle spans, as well as on
the competitiveness of the market and its structure. Since strong network effects are
indicated for telecommunications services, new technologies should be promoted by
governments until a critical mass is achieved, and policy measures should be implemented
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to prevent the abuse of market power.
Michalakelis et al. (2010) extend the classical diffusion framework with a "diffusion-
price" model to account for the influence of prices on penetration rates and vice-versa. They
estimate price and demand elasticities for several European countries based on figures from
the years 2003-2005 and predict how these interact. Price indices and hedonic functions are
combined with a diffusion function in order to forecast diffusion of technology innovations in
telecommunications. They state that price influences demand to a higher extent than the
other way around: "It is obvious that by setting a lower price demand increases, but the vice
versa can be the case only for the amount that makes the marginal cost of production equal
the marginal profit" (p. 235). Their model predicts a declining pricing path, while diffusion
increases more rapidly than shown with a classical diffusion model, which is based on the
elapsed time as the only diffusion variable. The estimations are confirmed by actual prices. 
2.2 Empirical Studies on Broadband Diffusion
There is an increasing body of research analysing the state of broadband diffusion in
various countries. The studies interpret data related to broadband uptake and compare them
to diffusion models, and to some degree also discuss explanations for the diffusion effects
analysed.
An early study of broadband diffusion forecasts future demand of high-speed internet
access in the US (Vanston, 2002). It uses the Gompertz model and estimates the speed of
adoption value by averaging the adoption speed of historical analogies, such as radio,
television, pay cable, mobile phones and internet access. From this, the study forecasts that
25% of households will subscribe to high-speed internet by 2005, and 50% by 2010. Over
this period, an evolution of data rates to an average of 10 Mbit/s is expected, advancing to
over 50 Mbit/s by 2015.
Concentrating on competition as a determinant of broadband diffusion, Denni and
Gruber (2007) conclude that the form of competition matters. They use semi-annual data of
the US for the period from 1999 to 2005, and apply the logistic diffusion function. They find
that inter-platform competition has a significant and positive impact on diffusion speed.
Contrarily, competition on the platform has a negative, or at least ambiguous, effect. The
authors suggest that firm size matters, and diffusion rates are higher when not too many
entrants challenge the incumbent, and are relatively large sized firms. Also, intra-platform
competition could reduce the investment incentives of incumbents. Other studies comparing
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data from European or OECD countries confirm the result that inter-platform competition
between Cable and DSL, or even FTTH, is more significant for broadband diffusion than
intra-platform competition (Bouckaert et al., 2010; Cava-Ferreruela and Alabau-Munoz, 2006;
Distaso et. al, 2005; Grosso, 2006; Tsuji et al. 2012; Wallsten, 2006). 
Based on survey data of households in the United Kingdom, Robertson et al. (2007)
estimate broadband adoption curves for different income segments. They notice that
diffusion models usually assume an equal probability of all consumers to adopt a product
with its introduction. In their view, this assumption is unrealistic as early adopters can be
different from late adopters, especially in terms of income. Segmentation of different income
groups could provide more accurate forecasts than aggregate approaches. Using the
Gompertz model, they are able to estimate broadband adoption curves for different
household income levels. As expected, they demonstrate that broadband penetration levels
are income sensitive. There are consistent patterns showing that highest income households
report a much faster adoption than the lowest. This might explain the effect of the digital
divide. Further, their model predicts that overall household adoption of broadband will
increase when lower income groups migrate to higher income categories.
Income, education, and population density were identified as statistically significant
demographic variables by Lee, Marcu and Lee (2011). The study applies the logistic
regression model on annual data for 30 OECD countries covering the years 2000 to 2008.
The main goal was to examine wether LLU had a positive effect on broadband diffusion. The
authors conclude that the speed of diffusion appears to increase with LLU, but could not rule
out that incentives to invest and long-term expected numbers of subscribers are negatively
affected. The simultaneous analysis of mobile broadband diffusion reveals that in many
OECD countries, mobile services appear to be a complement to fixed broadband. This could
be explained with the high income level in OECD countries. 
Unlike other studies, Belloc et al. (2012) examine the effect of both supply-side and
demand-side policies on broadband diffusion. Supply-side policies include (amongst others)
long-term loan and financing programs, and the creation of public-private-partnerships.
Demand-side policies relate to public demand, incentives to business, and private demand
such as educational programs, demand subsidies for low-income customer groups, as well
as aggregation of  potential subscribers to facilitate economies of scale. The estimations are
based on a four-step analysis involving OLS and quantile regression. Data are mainly
derived from a dataset that contains information on broadband policies adopted by 30 OECD
countries over the years 1995 to 2010. The authors observe that demand-side policies have
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in total a greater impact than supply-side intervention. This result might seem surprising,
given that most national policies focus on the supply-side. A further outcome of the study is
that the importance of the policies changes during the diffusion process. The influence of
demand-side policies increases in the later stages of broadband penetration. It seems that
demand-side incentives become more effective with greater availability of infrastructure. Also,
network effects might explain this result. On the other hand, supply-side policies lose their
relevance with increasing broadband diffusion. Consumers with a lower willingness to adopt
broadband become harder to reach as the market matures. Similarly, the effect of the degree
of competition is non-linear. The factor of competition is more important during the initial and
the advanced phase, and plays a less significant role in the intermediate stage of broadband
diffusion. The authors explain this result with the fact that competition enhances the
aggregate level of investment in the initial stage. During the intermediate stage, competitors
lower prices to acquire customers, which also results in customers switching operators, and
the effect on acquiring new customers is reduced. In the final stage, the pricing strategies of
competing operators might be exhausted so that they are forced to seek new customers by
extending the coverage of the networks.
Broadband data on regional level are analysed by Dauvin and Grzybowski (2013).
Their study is based on broadband penetration data for 96 so-called NUTS1 regions of 27
EU countries, expressed as subscriptions per households. In order to estimate effects of
competition, the analysis makes use of country-level household survey data for
approximating inter-platform competition, and country-level prices for LLU as well as the
incumbent's share in DSL-connections for measuring intra-platform competition. Applying
linear demand specifications and the logistic diffusion function, they find that both intra- and
inter-platform competition have significant impact on broadband diffusion. Higher HHI values
for inter-platform competition leads to lower broadband penetration. Similarly, broadband
penetration is lower in countries with a higher incumbent DSL share, as well as in countries
with higher LLU prices. They also found socioeconomic factors were relevant, such as
income, eduction, population density, and computer penetration. The relevance was of
varying degrees, depending on the applied diffusion models and regression methods.
Specifically for FTTB/H diffusion, Briglauer and Gugler (2013) apply a logistic model
to analyse actual data for household penetration in various countries. They present figures
that confirm the sigmoid-shaped diffusion process. For some Asian countries with high
deployment rates close to full national coverage, the authors can establish a saturation level
of about 50%. They suggest that this level holds for the other countries as well. They also
find that the inflection point will be reached much later in the US and EU countries than in
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Asian countries that have already reached that point between 2007 and 2008. According to
their estimation for the US as well as Northern and Eastern European countries, half of the
saturation level will not be reached before 2015 and 2014 respectively, not to mention other
European countries, which lag behind even further. Consistently, similar findings are drawn
for the speed of diffusion. The growth rates for leading Northern European countries and the
US are substantially lower than for Asian countries. The authors regard different levels of
state aid, competition, and access regulation as the reasons for these differences in diffusion
speed. They conclude that cost-based access regulation reduces broadband investments,
albeit without statistically linking this finding to the diffusion analysis. 
A recent study by Lin and Wu (2013) provides insights into the effects of multiple
determinants for broadband diffusion. The idea of this study is to show that the significance
of various factors differs for different stages of the diffusion process. The authors examine
the stages of broadband development based on data gathered by the OECD for some 30
countries in the years 1997-2009. They use the Gompertz model because unlike the logistic
model it does not require estimation of the total number of potential adopters for a certain
time in a given country. For the panel regression, the authors apply generalized methods of
moments (GMM) dynamic panel-data estimation developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), in
order to account for the endogeneity problem caused by the lagged value of a dependent
variable, namely the previous penetration. Based on Rogers (2003) they identify five
categories of adopters and cluster them into three groups: innovators and early adopters,
early majority, and late majority and laggards. In accordance with previous studies, the
authors demonstrate that income, education, broadband price, platform competition, content,
as well as previous broadband penetration, are significant determinants for broadband
diffusion. However, they also find that the significance differs for the three categories of
adopters, or stages of the diffusion process. The initial stage is determined by income,
education and broadband price. This is consistent with the general observation that early
adopters belong to wealthier and more educated groups of the population. More surprisingly,
the broadband price has a positive significant coefficient during this stage, which suggests
that broadband services are seen as a conspicuous good with a positive price elasticity of
demand. Hence, in the early stage of broadband diffusion, higher prices do not seem to lower
the demand. For the second stage, the authors identify both previous broadband penetration
and platform competition to have the highest effect. The final stage of diffusion is
characterised by a significant negative effect of broadband price while platform competition
does not seem to matter. Therefore, affordable prices are much more relevant for the
latecomers than competition between the various broadband technology platforms, namely
DSL, cable, fibre, satellite and wireless. From their findings, the authors also deduce policy
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recommendations, which however appear to be too precipitant to be solid. 
2.3 The Effect of Government Intervention on NGA Investment and Penetration
In addition to the studies on general determinants of broadband diffusion, a further
body of literature benchmarks various regulatory instruments and other forms of government
intervention with respect to their effects on NGA uptake (adoption) and investments.
2.3.1 Effects on Adoption
To predict the effects of regulation on broadband adoption, Crandall et al. (2013)
perform a regression analysis on OECD data of broadband penetration levels in 28 countries
for the years 2001 to 2010. They build on the methods of an earlier study by Boyle, Howell
and Zhang (2008), taking heteroskedasticity into account, but use more recent data and add
further explanatory variables. The approach of the analysis is to test to what degree
unbundling and line-sharing either shift the entire broadband diffusion curve or alter its slope.
In confirmation of the results of previous studies, the authors arrive at a rather disappointing
outcome for regulation. They find that there is evidence that unbundling regulation slows
broadband penetration and reduces the slope of the diffusion curve. In addition, the authors
predict that the effect of regulation is worse for fibre technology. They find it unlikely that fibre
unbundling will provide net economic benefits. Due to the more complex issues of fibre
unbundling, regulatory policies to grant network access to competitors most likely would raise
deployment costs and increase the risk of regulatory error.
The effect of regulation on the adoption specifically of NGA services is the concern of
an empirical assessment by Briglauer (2013). Based on panel data regarding connected
NGA lines in all 27 EU member states for the years 2004 to 2012, his regression analysis
shows that wholesale broadband access regulation has a substantial negative impact on
NGA adoption. This outcome can be explained with reduced investment incentives for both
regulated incumbent infrastructure operators and potential entrants. Existing wholesale
regulation causes the expectation that cost-oriented access pricing of NGA networks will
lower the profits and hence the net present value of infrastructure investments. Access
regulation also typically ignores opportunity costs of real options and the asymmetric
distribution of risks between investing operators and access-seeking entrants. Regulatory
uncertainty impedes NGA investments even further. Briglauer also establishes that
competition from mobile networks entails opposing effects. Fixed-line network operators
might be incentivized to escape mobile competition by upgrading their networks to speeds
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which cannot be achieved with mobile broadband networks. On the other hand, mobile
competition will eventually decrease the potential rents from NGA investments. For now, the
escape competition effects dominate. Further, the analysis reveals a replacement effect with
respect to 'old' broadband by which consumers are reluctant to switch to NGA unless its
incremental benefits are large and transparent enough (consumer inertia). Finally, substantial
network effects are found that result in an endogenous NGA adoption process that pushes
the uptake of new ICT services. The larger the subscriber base becomes, the more related
applications and content will be developed, which in turn leads to higher utility for consumers,
and their willingness to adopt NGA services. Briglauer concludes that the Digital Agenda of
the European Commission to reach 50% households with high-speed internet connections by
2020 seems in principle to be at odds with the EU sector-specific regulatory framework.
However, the endogenous adoption process means that the target can still be reached if
technologies other than FTTH/B are taken into account, no demand or supply side shocks
occur, and no counter-effective policy incentives are implemented.
2.3.2 Effects on Investments
The finding that unbundling regulation has negative effects is in line with studies that
estimate the relationship between regulation and investments. 
In the context of net neutrality, Wallsten and Hausladen (2009) were among the first
to discuss the effects of local loop unbundling on investment in new fibre networks in Europe.
They regard net neutrality as another form of mandatory network sharing, and unbundling as
the EU's general response to net neutrality. The interesting point of the study is the result that
regardless of the effects of unbundling on net neutrality, regulation of networks can
negatively impact investment incentives. The authors prove their point by demonstrating a
simple correlation between the number of fibre broadband connections with the number of
unbundled lines per capita in the form of either DSL over unbundled local loop or bitstream
access. Controlling for GDP, they find that more unbundled lines are associated with fewer
fibre broadband connections provided by both incumbents and entrants. On the other hand,
there is a positive correlation between cable and fibre connections, suggesting that
incumbents react to cable competition with investments in fibre broadband networks.
A more recent econometric study is provided by Grajek and Röller (2012), who base
their analysis on a model that differentiates between investments of incumbents and
entrants. The authors take endogeneity of regulation into account. This might arise when
regulators base their decisions on the level of investments already made by network
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operators; regulation might not only have an effect on the investment decisions of operators,
but also the investment decisions could affect regulation. The authors measure the level of
infrastructure investments for 70 fixed-line telecom operators in 20 EU member states during
the years 1997 to 2006. In order to determine the intensity of regulation, they make use of
the detailed and comprehensive Plaut regulatory index, which seems to be more precise
than relying on the number of wholesale products or the prices of local loop unbundling. As a
result, the authors establish that access regulation discourages investment by incumbents
and individual entrants alike. Entrants' total investment increases though, which suggests
that easier access pushes entrants towards service based competition. Further, incumbents
react to investments by entrants and invest more as entrants' total investment increases. The
authors estimate for Europe a loss in industry investments of some EUR 16.4 billion over ten
years due to access regulation. They also conclude that endogeneity of regulation in fact
exists, resulting in a regulatory commitment problem. Finally they find that regulators respond
differently to investments by incumbents as compared to those by entrants. While access
regulation is not affected by investments of entrants, increased investments of incumbents
result in expanded access regulation.
Another econometric model is used by Bacache et al. (2013) to investigate whether
the ladder-of-investment hypothesis underlying the European regulatory approach holds true
in reality. The ladder-of-investment theory claims that service-based competitors will climb up
the ladder of regulatory wholesale products to eventually deploy their own networks and
become infrastructure-based operators (Cave and Vogelsang, 2003; Cave, 2006). A typical
scenario would be a competitor starting with wholesale products such as resale or bitstream
access, then migrating towards local loop unbundling, and finally ending up with own access
networks. Once entrants have gained a sufficiently large customer base, they can climb up
the wholesale product ladder and gradually invest in their own infrastructure. The authors
analyse wholesale data from 15 EU countries for the years 2002 to 2010 and reject the
ladder-of-investment hypothesis. The empirical evidence does not show an impact of the
number of unbundled lines on investment in new access infrastructure by new entrants. At
the very most, there is a weak empirical support for a "short ladder" by means of which
entrants move from bitstream access to local loop unbundling but do not invest further in own
(fibre based) access infrastructure. Evidently, the study only proves that the regulatory reality
in Europe is incompatible with the ladder-of-investment hypothesis. It could still be
conceivable that a correct application of the ladder-of-investment would result in more
investment by entrants if the regulatory agencies successively took rungs away, i.e.
deregulated wholesale products over time, and hence set incentives for entrants to invest in
infrastructure.
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Briglauer et al. (2013) find that the type of competition matters for the degree of
investments in NGA networks. They quantify the effects of both service-based and
infrastructure-based competition on the deployment of NGA in the 27 EU member states
during the period of 2005 to 2011. Service-based competition is measured as the percentage
of regulated and actually used wholesale broadband lines. According to the findings of the
study, the more effective access regulation of DSL-based broadband is, the less investments
are made in NGA. As a result, the ladder-of-investment hypothesis does not hold for NGA,
and access regulation reduces investment incentives. Infrastructure-based competition has
multiple opposing effects, resulting in a relationship between competition and investment that
can be depicted with an inverted U-shaped curve (theorised by Aghion et. al, 2005). First,
incentives to invest into NGA are low because these new infrastructures cannibalise profits
from existing copper-based broadband networks. Second, with increasing competition
incentives to invest increase as network operators now try to jump ahead of rivals. Third, as
perfect competition approaches, potential rents are reduced and incentives to invest decline.
In conclusion, the degree of inter-platform competition from mobile networks and cable
operators also influences NGA deployment. 
Comparing developed and developing countries, Gulati and Yates (2012) examine the
effect of policy instruments and regulation on broadband diffusion. They find that there are
differences in the impact of policy measures on broadband diffusion depending on the state
of development of a country. Specifically, in developed countries, the degree of competition is
not a statistically significant determinant for the uptake of broadband services, whereas it is
in developing countries. The authors explain this result by the fact that the positive effect of
competing over customers diminishes in the later stages of diffusion when the uptake rate
begins to decrease. Also, the political structure (such as democracy) plays a more significant
role in developing countries than in developed. The study finds a positive relationship
between financial investment in ICT and broadband diffusion for both developing and
developed countries. This is not surprising as it measures overall national expenditure in ICT,
and it remains unclear to what extent the measured financial investment results from public
financing and governmental incentives to invest. 
The focus of a study by Montolio and Trillas (2013) lies on the question whether
centralisation of public policies benefits broadband deployment. Public intervention in
broadband internet access markets can be pursued by local authorities or on more
centralised levels (such as federal state or EU level). While local governments might be
better suited for the management of local rights of way, centralised institutions might be more
efficient in dealing with cross-border issues. The study finds no positive relationship between
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broadband deployment and centralised public intervention (different forms of centralization
are either irrelevant or have a negative impact).
2.4 Summary of Empirical Findings
Numerous empirical studies in the field of broadband diffusion unequivocally
demonstrate several factors that are important to consider when judging on policies to
enhance broadband availability. First, the diffusion of next generation broadband technology
follows the sigmoid diffusion curve common for all forms of technological development. In the
initial stage, uptake will be slow, and in the first years consumers will only show limited
demand. It would be a mistake to see the slow uptake as a market failure that needed to be
remedied with certain policy measures. In the long run, the maximum diffusion will be
reached, no matter which strategies governments follow. For the penetration of NGA, it has
been estimated that the saturation level is attained at about 50% of households. The only
impact governmental policies generally will have is on the overall speed with which diffusion
occurs, depicted by a more or less steep diffusion curve. 
Second, there are many explanatory factors for the variation of diffusion speeds in
different countries. Most of them relate to general socioeconomic circumstances and are
outside of the scope of broadband policy. Especially the duration of the first stage of diffusion
is influenced by income and GDP, but also education and population density play a major
role. In the later stages, the level of the existing previous broadband penetration is important
as well. There is a learning effect, and higher penetration in the early stages spills over to
later stages and accelerates diffusion even more. Also, the availability of content, which
makes a use case for consumers, is relevant. If the utility is clear for consumers, they are
more likely to upgrade their network access. This has been described as consumer inertia
and also been established as a factor for the New Zealand market in a household survey
(Mirza and Beltrán, 2013).
Subsidies and other financial incentives can accelerate the deployment of new
broadband access lines. It should be noted, however, that penetration will be stimulated
more by demand-side than by supply-side incentives. Also, demand-side policies are mainly
effective in the later stages of the diffusion. In light of these findings, the possible positive
impact of financial aid to build up broadband network infrastructures seems to be
questionable. 
There has been a huge debate about the role of access regulation for the deployment
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of next generation access networks. Especially the European Union is led by the idea that
competition drives technology and favours a strict regime of access regulation, although it
has been pointed out that network operators might underinvest in the light of ex-ante
regulation (Winkler and Baumgarten, 2009, p. 450). The empirics now clearly and
unequivocally demonstrate that access regulation has in fact had a negative impact on the
speed of broadband diffusion. Both the penetration speed and the efforts of infrastructure
operators are being hampered by access regulation. The heavier access regulation is, the
less progressively investments are made by incumbents and entrants alike. This clear
empirical picture is also pertinent to NGA diffusion. If anything, access regulation slows down
the deployment of NGA. In particular, free-riding problems stemming from an asymmetric
distribution of risk, as well as regulatory uncertainty, diminish investment incentives. The
ladder-of-investment hypothesis has been empirically disproven, although it could be argued
that it has been applied wrongly by keeping all access regulation rungs (regulated wholesale
products) in place.
More relevant seems to be the existence of inter-platform competition. Such
competition to new fibre optical networks can stem from cable operators or high-speed data
mobile networks. This form of competition is not induced by access regulation (such as local
loop unbundling or bitstream access). Intra-platform competition, on the other hand, has
been found to be less significant for network diffusion. Governments can nevertheless
accelerate NGA uptake by providing a regulatory environment that favours inter-platform
competition. For example, cost-effective licensing of LTE (4G) mobile spectrums could be an
advantageous strategy. Effective competition from mobile technologies can induce
broadband network operators to upgrade their networks in order to escape that competition.
3 Situation of NGA development in New Zealand 
Internationally, New Zealand is not on the forefront of NGA uptake. Countries like
Japan, South Korea, and Sweden have achieved impressive fibre access network uptakes in
the last years, greatly pushed by massive state interventions and subsidies. But is New
Zealand lagging behind? And what should or could be done about it?
The following sections briefly address some issues that are relevant for the
development of next generation fibre access networks in New Zealand. Parallels to the
development of broadband in the early 2000s can be seen, with similar demand-side and
supply-side factors playing a role. However, more research involving analysis of actual
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uptake figures would be needed to permit decisive conclusions.
3.1 Parallels to the Development of Broadband 
The current situation in New Zealand is broadly comparable to the substitution from
dial-up to broadband internet roughly ten years ago. At that time, public opinion expressed
that New Zealand was lagging behind other countries in the uptake of broadband. However,
the relatively slow uptake was due to specific factors of demand, and not to underinvestment
in infrastructure. 
As Howell and Obren (2003) point out, the substitution of dial-up internet access with
DSL was (during the early 2000s) primarily observed in the business market. The residential
broadband market showed a slow uptake although general internet connectivity of New
Zealand's residents was large, with New Zealand consistently being among the top ten
OECD countries. Consumers still seemed to have to learn about applications that made
broadband connections necessary. The authors predicted that as more dial-up consumers
learn about applications, and use them, the rate of information exchange will increase and
broadband substitution will follow. Next to these learning effects, Howell (2003) found that
dial-up products had a very high quality and were so cheap that consumers did not have
incentives to switch to broadband yet. New Zealand exhibited no signs of market failure, and
showed widespread coverage of broadband with DSL being available to 85% of the country's
telecommunications customers. Also the prices for broadband were amongst the lowest
within the OECD. However, the internet transfer volume was very low in relation to the high
overall usage of the internet. This implied that there was a shortage of applications from
which New Zealand's users could derive productivity or utility benefits. This demand-side
problem could not have been addressed by infrastructure regulation. In other words, it was
foreseeable that the emergence of bandwidth requiring applications would be necessary to
drive increased broadband uptake.
The actual market development appears to confirm those predictions. New Zealand
has achieved a level of broadband penetration which compares favourably to other OECD
countries, and has recently even overtaken some of its peers. According to OECD statistics1
of June 2013, New Zealand has (with 29.5 fixed broadband subscriptions per 100
inhabitants) a penetration rate just slightly above OECD average (26.7%), and is even
followed by the USA (29.3%), Japan (27.8%), and Australia (25.6%). As to fibre access
networks, New Zealand's penetration level of 0.3% is far behind the leading countries like
1 OECD: http://www.oecd.org/sti/broadband/oecdbroadbandportal.htm.
15
Korea (23.3%), Japan (19.1%), or Sweden (11.6%), but comparable to many other
economies, such as Germany (0.3%), Austria (0.4%), Australia (0.5%), Italy (0.5%), France
(0.6%), and Canada (0.7%). 
In sum, the question arises whether New Zealand is actually far behind within the
OECD, and whether the seemingly slow uptake of high-speed broadband access is really a
market failure that needs government intervention. As a government plan with subsidized
private public partnerships to roll-out ultra-fast broadband (UFB) is already in progress, this
question can only be discussed in terms of an ex-post assessment of the efficiency and
effectiveness of this programme. Nevertheless, such an exercise would be a valuable
contribution as it could highlight potential problems with UFB uptake in the future, and also
might put expectations about the market for next-generation access into perspective. To
evaluate the current situation, both demand-side and supply-side factors could be assessed,
some of which are introduced in the following sections.
3.2 Demand-side Factors of NGA uptake
Consumers will switch to new internet access technology only if they expect to
experience a more valuable use that at least outweighs the higher cost associated with the
new technology (Howell, 2006). The higher bandwidth of ultra-fast broadband (UFB) internet
connections are not as such an argument to switch, but rather applications which require
higher speeds than presently available for a consumer. Speed of internet connections faces
diminishing marginal returns. The advantage of an ultra-high speed internet connection is
larger compared to a low speed internet connection than compared to a high speed
connection. A consumer already having a broadband access of, say, up to 50 Mbit/s will less
likely switch to UFB than a consumer who until previously could only get 1 Mbit/s. As a result,
one can expect a slower uptake rate of UFB than was seen in the case of the switch from
dial-up to ADSL and cable broadband.
Hence, the main question from a demand-side perspective is which applications could
drive demand for UFB, and make "normal" broadband redundant over time? The main
application which currently requires most of the bandwidth is video streaming. Internet traffic
analysed by a network solution company2 show that in the USA applications such as Netflix
and Youtube are responsible for the major share in internet bandwidth usage, and have
outrun peer-to-peer traffic in the last years. For the European and the Asia-Pacific regions,
peer-to-peer still remains the strongest traffic generator. According to Sandvine, this suggests
2 Sandvine, 2013: https://www.sandvine.com/trends/global-internet-phenomena/
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that users download many movies and TV series via peer-to-peer, but would be willing to
change to paid services such as Netflix if they were available and comparably priced in the
respective regions. Once similar services become more readily available in New Zealand, it
can be expected that video streaming platforms will drive demand for higher broadband
speeds in this country as well. 
Video streaming can currently be seen as a selling argument for UFB, but presumably
only for users who do not have access to medium-speed internet connections provided for by
ADSL+ and VDSL (i.e. somewhere in the range of 16 to 50 Mbit/s). This medium-speed
range is sufficient for HD video streaming, and even several streams simultaneously. Netflix,
for example, recommends an internet connection of 7 Mbit/s for Super HD and of 12 Mbit/s
for 3D.3 Although other factors than bandwidth may influence video quality, it is safe to say
that medium-speed internet access is fairly sufficient even in a multiple person household.
However, with the advancement of 4K TV screen technology, further bandwidth requirements
can already be anticipated.
It seems to be very conceivable that the driving factor for UFB uptake in New Zealand
is, under the current set of applications, the migration from low bandwidth broadband (ADSL)
to higher bandwidths required for video streaming. Households that already have access to
medium range broadband will be less likely switch to UFB as the marginal cost for doing so
would not be countered by at least the same marginal benefit. This is because under the
current situation, the marginal benefit would be close to zero for the average consumer. For
existing medium-speed customers, the only viable argument to switch access products would
be that UFB turns actually out to be cheaper than the conventional copper-based
equivalents. An empirical analysis of recent UFB uptake data could show whether these
assumptions are correct and apply to New Zealand. If mainly users that do not have access
to medium-range broadband buy UFB internet access, while those that did have access are
not inclined to pay for UFB, then this would indicate diminishing marginal returns of internet
access speed, i.e. that users generally do not value more speed as much if the existing
speed already satisfies their current needs.
A related question is how much the demand of new networks is dependent on the
availability of applications. One could assume that there are two reciprocal network effects in
place that determine the diffusion curve of ultra-fast broadband networks: the availability of
bandwidth-hungry applications drives the demand for high-speed broadband access; but also
the uptake of high-speed broadband access enables the market for applications that rely on
3 Netflix: help.netflix.com/en/node/306
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such uptake. It has been observed for Japan, for example, that although a nationwide high-
speed fibre access network exists with very wide coverage and uptake, the cloud-based
applications that require the available bandwidth (speed) are not yet in sight (Kushida, 2013).
The reason is that application providers, such as Youtube, Netflix, and Dropbox, focus on
global markets and the broadband access speed that can be expected to exist in the major
parts of the world. This market mechanism should be even more significant for the much
smaller economy of New Zealand. Further, applications that depend on latency rather than
volume will not benefit from an increase in speed of the access network alone if it can be
assumed that remote regions like New Zealand remain disadvantaged due to the distance
data packages need to travel (Obren and Howell, 2010).
The demand-side factors of UFB uptake are difficult to address by government
intervention.   Legal obstacles to providing bandwidth demanding applications do not appear
to exist in New Zealand. The relevant market players (such as broadcasting companies, film
producers, and video streaming portals) just have to come up with offers that would utilize
increasing bandwidth availability in the country. However, as said above, applications which
require the incremental bandwidth of UFB compared to medium scale broadband are still to
be developed. This problem is not peculiar to New Zealand, and only time will tell which
bandwidth-hungry applications will be demanded. 
Demand-side interventions by governments, such as investments in education for
computer and internet literacy, certainly have the potential to enhance demand for
broadband. However, such financial support will not be able to shift demand from medium
range broadband to UFB. This would require stimulation of the supply of bandwidth
demanding applications. Subsidies of media companies would be an option; however, as
there are no apparent signs of market failure in this respect, any government intervention
should be considered with caution as it could potentially distort markets more than it would
vitalize the economy. Specific research of internet application producing industries would be
required to make conclusive recommendations.
3.3 Supply-side Factors of NGA deployment
Globally, governments have focused on supply-side factors in their aim to enhance
availability of ultra-fast broadband (UFB). There are two main approaches that also have
significance in New Zealand: subsidies of UFB networks and sector-specific regulation of
telecommunications.
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3.3.1 Subsidies of UFB networks
In 2009, the New Zealand government started the UFB initiative with the aim to roll
out ultra-fast broadband to 75% of the population within ten years. To lower the risk for
private investment, public private partnerships (PPP) were set up, which are funded with a
NZD 1.5bn government investment. The PPPs are managed by the government owned
Crown Fibre Holdings (CFH). CFH agreed with four operators to roll out fibre access
networks in 33 priority areas that mainly comprise densely populated regions. Chorus, the
structurally separated network arm of the former incumbent Telecom, is responsible for
roughly 70% of the roll-out areas, while the three remaining operators deploy fibre in the
regions of Whangarei (Northpower), Christchurch (Enable), and Waikato (Ultrafast Fibre).
CFH maintains individual agreements about the deployment details and timelines with the
respective network operators. Further, CFH acquired shares in Chorus and in the
aforementioned local fibre subsidiaries of the other partners, referred to as Local Fibre
Companies (LFC). By virtue of the PPP agreements, the fibre access network operators do
not sell fibre connections to consumers directly, but rather provide wholesale products for
about 50 New Zealand internet retail service providers. The LFCs are rewarded on the basis
of providing broadband access on the wholesale level in a particular area (premises passed).
By July 2013, the LFCs had deployed fibre access to 229,633 premises (which equals
about 20% of the initiative's objective; CFH, Annual Report 2013, p. 15). On the demand-
side, just under 10,000 customers had signed-up for connections (including private
households, businesses, and schools). This penetration level of about 4% of connectable
premises is in line with CFH's expectations.
However, some issues with the government plan seem to be unresolved. Chorus
currently needs NZD 3200 on average to pass each premise, and it appears not to be able to
cover its operating costs with the current level of CFH funding, which gives rise to doubts
whether the UFB initiative provides sufficient means to reach its targets (Sadowski et al.,
2013, p. 76). The main issue will be whether the residential uptake will follow the deployment
rate, and whether the network operators will be able to sell sufficient UFB wholesale products
to cover their cost. An important aspect is that the main roll-out regions are overlapping to a
large extent with areas where medium-speed broadband networks are already available,
including the recently built up VDSL network of Chorus (FTTN). An analysis of recent
demand-side data could clarify the substitution effects between existing broadband
infrastructure and newly deployed fibre networks, and possibly shed light on the financing
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issues of the four LFCs in New Zealand.  
3.3.2 Regulatory Environment
While New Zealand's UFB networks are not subject to sector-specific access
regulation, the network operators act in an environment that is determined by pricing rules for
copper-based wholesale products. The Commerce Commission issues standard term
determinations (STDs) that set out the terms on which telecommunications service providers
(namely Chorus) must offer wholesale services regulated under the Telecommunications Act
2001 to other telecommunications service providers. The regulated fixed-line wholesale
products include copper-based local loop unbundling (ULL), line-sharing access to the low-
frequency band of the copper local loop, and bitstream access. Currently, only Chorus is
regulated, being the structurally separated network arm of the former monopolist Telecom. 
The UFB networks are, as such, unregulated. Access to wholesale products for
retailers are part of the agreements with CFH. By virtue of these arrangements, UFB network
operators cannot offer retail services themselves. As a result, structural separation between
UFB networks and retail services exists throughout New Zealand.
The regulatory environment likely has an effect on the deployment of UFB networks. It
is clear that New Zealand's approach favours UFB over copper-based high-speed internet
access. As a result, the regulatory environment might cause inconsistencies (Heatley and
Howell, 2010; Howell, 2012). Currently, the wholesale prices for access to copper are higher
compared to equivalent fibre wholesale prices. Therefore, retail internet service providers are
able to offer fibre-based broadband connections that should be more attractive for
consumers than the DSL-based counterparts (Sadowski et al., 2003, p. 75). Although this
situation perfectly fits the objective of a fast UFB uptake, it might cause adverse effects for
competing broadband networks that are not subsidized, such as the recently rolled out VDSL
network of Chorus, and the 4G mobile networks that make use of auctioned frequencies. 
Moreover, the incentives of retail service providers to offer UFB based internet
products are not clear cut. Because of vertical separation they are not invested in network
deployment and are able to choose between different wholesale platforms to offer fixed
broadband connections; that is DSL, cable, and UFB. Also, network operators face the
question as to whether competition with existing broadband lines is a sensible strategy in the
first phase of deployment, or should be delayed to the later stages. Especially, Chorus
potentially could cannibalize its existing VDSL lines by deploying parallel fibre access lines.
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On the other hand, the cost of deploying UFB should be lowest in those regions which
already have high-speed internet access. This creates incentives to invest in those areas
first. It will be interesting to see how Chorus deals with this dilemma. A recent amendment to
the agreement between CFH and Chorus might give an indication: amongst others, Chorus
will have greater flexibility in the deployment of UFB in areas where Chorus already has an
extensive fibre footprint.4
In sum, the regulatory environment is complex, but also an essential factor of the
deployment of UFB in New Zealand. An appraisal of its effects would best be achieved by
looking at actual developments. An analysis of data on network distribution and retail prices
could shed light on the impact of regulation on UFB deployment in New Zealand.
4 Conclusion
The review of empirical research on broadband diffusion revealed several factors that
are relevant for the deployment of next generation access (NGA) networks. First, the
diffusion of next generation broadband technology follows the sigmoid diffusion curve
common to all forms of technological development. In the initial stage, uptake will be slow,
and in the first years of deployment of a new technology, such as ultra-fast broadband,
consumers will only show limited demand. It would be a mistake to see the slow uptake as a
market failure, which needed to be remedied with certain policy measures. In the long time
perspective, the maximum diffusion will be reached, no matter which strategies governments
follow. The only impact politics generally will have is on the overall speed with which diffusion
occurs, depicted by a more or less steep diffusion curve. Second, there are many
explanatory factors for the variation of diffusion speeds in different countries. Most of them
relate to general socioeconomic circumstances and are outside of the scope of broadband
policy. Especially the duration of the first stage of diffusion is influenced by income and GDP,
but also education and population density play a major role. The availability of content which
makes a use case for consumers is relevant as well. If the utility is clear for consumers, they
are more likely to upgrade their network access. 
Government intervention in form of subsidies and other financial incentives can
accelerate the deployment of new broadband access lines, but penetration will be stimulated
more by demand-side than by supply-side incentives. In light of these findings, the possible
positive impact of financial aid to build up broadband network infrastructures seems to be
4 CFH, 2014: http://www.crownfibre.govt.nz/2014/03/chorus-crown-fibre-holdings-agree-package-ufb-
improvements/
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questionable. As to regulation, empirics now clearly and unequivocally demonstrate that
access regulation has in fact had a negative impact on the speed of broadband diffusion.
Both the penetration speed and the efforts of infrastructure operators are being hampered by
access regulation. This clear empirical picture also fits to NGA diffusion. If at all, access
regulation slows down the deployment of NGA. Much more relevant seems to be the
existence of inter-platform competition. Such competition to new fibre optical networks can
stem from cable operators or high-speed data mobile networks. For example, cost-effective
licensing of LTE (4G) mobile spectrum could be an advantageous strategy. Effective
competition from mobile technologies can induce broadband network operators to upgrade
their networks in order to escape that competition.
These elements are applicable to the situation in New Zealand and its ultra-fast
broadband network that is currently being built. It can be questioned whether New Zealand is
actually far behind within the OECD, and whether the seemingly slow uptake of high-speed
broadband access was really a market failure that needed government intervention. To
evaluate the current situation, both demand-side and supply-side factors should be
assessed. From a consumer perspective, video streaming can currently be seen as the main
selling argument for ultra-fast broadband (UFB), but presumably only for users who do not
have access to medium-speed internet connections provided for by copper-based internet
access. Although other factors than bandwidth may influence video quality, it is safe to say
that medium-speed internet access is currently sufficient even in a multiple person
household. 
What presumably matters most for consumer demand is not the absolute speed of
internet connections, but rather the increase in speed in relation to the existing access
technology. The higher the existing broadband speed, the less likely consumers will be to
switch to new technology, absent applications requiring that increase in speed. Therefore, it
seems conceivable that the driving factor for UFB uptake in New Zealand is, under the
current set of applications, the migration from low bandwidth broadband (ADSL) to higher
bandwidths required for video streaming. An empirical analysis of recent UFB uptake data
could show whether these assumptions apply to New Zealand. 
The regulatory environment likely has an effect on the deployment of UFB networks. It
is clear that New Zealand's approach favours UFB over copper-based high-speed internet
access. Currently, the wholesale prices for access to copper are higher compared to
equivalent fibre wholesale prices. As a result, retail internet service providers are able to offer
fibre-based broadband connections that should be more attractive for consumers than the
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DSL-based counterparts. Although this situation perfectly fits the objective of a fast UFB
uptake, it might cause adverse effects for competing broadband networks that are not
subsidized, such as the recently rolled out VDSL network of Chorus, and the 4G mobile
networks that make use of auctioned frequencies. 
Moreover, the incentives of retail service providers to offer UFB based internet
products are not clear cut. Because of vertical separation they are not invested in network
deployment and are able to choose between different wholesale platforms to offer fixed
broadband connections. The regulatory environment is complex, but also an essential factor
of the deployment of UFB in New Zealand. An appraisal of its effects would best be achieved
by looking at actual developments. An analysis of data on network distribution and retail
prices could shed light on the impact of regulation on UFB deployment in New Zealand.
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